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  OPINION 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Plaintiff Sheldon Stephens appeals the dismissal of his 
claims against Defendant Kevin Clash for injuries resulting 
from the parties’ sexual relationship while Stephens was 
underage, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422, 18 U.S.C. § 2423, 
and state law.  The District Court dismissed Stephens’s 
claims as untimely.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
I. 
 Because the District Court dismissed both Stephens’s 
complaint and his amended complaint on motions pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the facts recited 
here are drawn from those pleadings.  Kevin Clash is “an 
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internationally-known puppeteer and voice actor for 
children’s programming,” best known for his role as the voice 
of Sesame Street’s Elmo.  A42, A52.  Stephens and Clash met 
at a “social networking event for models and actors” in 2004 
when Stephens was 16 years old and Clash was 
approximately 44.  A43, A56.  According to Stephens, 
“[f]rom their earliest conversations, Clash led [Stephens] to 
believe that [Clash] was interested in having a sexual 
relationship” with Stephens.  A44, A54.  Clash arranged by 
telephone on several occasions to have Stephens transported 
from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania to New York City by 
chauffeured car for the purpose of a sexual relationship.  The 
two engaged in a “pattern of sexual activity . . . over a period 
of years.”  A44, A54. 
 Although he was “a compliant victim showered with 
attention and affection,” Stephens contends that he “did not 
become aware that he had suffered adverse psychological and 
emotional effects from Clash’s sexual acts and conduct until 
2011.”  A45, A55.  According to Stephens, because of his 
“compliance with the sexual relationship” and the “attention 
and affection” Clash gave him, Stephens “could not 
reasonably have been expected to know that he had been 
injured and that Clash had caused his injuries at the time of 
their sexual contact.”  A45, A55.   
 On the other hand, as stated in the amended complaint, 
Clash “compelled [Stephens] to engage in sexual contacts by 
intellectual, emotional and psychological force.”  A56.  Clash 
did so by “ingratiat[ing] himself to [Stephens] through 
[Clash’s] wealth and celebrity with knowledge that 
[Stephens] wanted to enter the modeling industry.”  Id.  
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Taking advantage of Stephens’s “low self-esteem and 
depression,” Clash then “dominate[d] [Stephens] in a sexual 
relationship.”  Id. 
 Stephens eventually sued in March 2013—
approximately nine years after the parties’ relationship began, 
and seven years after Stephens turned 18 in 2006—bringing 
claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a)1 as well as a sexual 
battery claim under state law.  Clash moved to dismiss the 
complaint on statute of limitations grounds, and the District 
Court dismissed Stephens’s federal claims as untimely.  In 
doing so, the District Court assumed the discovery rule 
applied generally to § 2255 claims but held that Stephens’s 
complaint demonstrated that he “discovered or should have 
discovered his injury in or before July 2006,” thus rendering 
his federal claims untimely.  A26.  But the District Court 
permitted Stephens to amend his complaint as to his state law 
claim.  The District Court then granted Clash’s second motion 
to dismiss Stephens’s state law claim as untimely.  Applying 
                                                 
1 Section 2255 creates a private cause of action for several 
federal crimes if the victim was a minor, including violations 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2422 and 18 U.S.C. § 2423.  In general, § 
2422 criminalizes knowingly persuading, inducing, enticing, 
or coercing an individual to travel in interstate commerce “to 
engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any 
person can be charged with a criminal offense.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2422(a).  Similarly, § 2423 criminalizes, inter alia, the 
knowing transportation of a minor in interstate commerce 
“with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or in 
any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with 
a criminal offense.”  Id. § 2423(a). 
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Pennsylvania’s borrowing statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 5521(b), the District Court looked to New York’s one-year 
statute of limitations for battery claims, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 215(3), 
and New York’s tolling statute for claims that accrue during 
infancy, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 208.   Under New York law, 
Stephens’s sexual battery claim was time-barred.  Stephens 
appeals these dismissals, urging that the discovery rule tolled 
the statute of limitations for his federal claims and that 
Pennsylvania’s longer statute of limitations for childhood 
sexual abuse should have applied to his sexual battery claims.   
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332, as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 regarding 
Stephens’s federal claims.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
A. 
 We first examine whether the discovery rule is 
applicable to claims brought under § 2255.  In general, the 
discovery rule “tolls the limitations period until the plaintiff 
learns of his cause of action or with reasonable diligence 
could have done so” and “is an exception to the usual 
principle that the statute of limitations begins to run 
immediately upon accrual regardless of whether or not the 
injured party has any idea what has happened to him.”  
William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey (Graham II), 646 F.3d 
138, 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2011).  To determine whether the 
discovery rule is available, we look to whether Congress 
intended that the discovery rule would not apply, either “by 
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explicit command or by implication from the structure and 
text of the statute,” in which case we defer to that directive.  
William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey (Graham I), 568 F.3d 
425, 434 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Disabled in Action of Pa. v. 
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2008)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).2  But “[i]n the absence of 
a contrary directive from Congress, we apply the federal 
discovery rule.”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Disabled 
in Action, 539 F.3d at 209) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 We begin with the statute’s text.  At the time Stephens 
filed his complaint, § 2255 provided that “[a]ny action 
commenced under this section shall be barred unless the 
complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first 
accrues or in the case of a person under a legal disability, not 
later than three years after the disability.”  18 U.S.C. 
                                                 
2 Graham I described this inquiry as analyzing whether 
Congress had “specified an accrual date.”  Graham I, 568 
F.3d at 434 (quoting Disabled in Action, 539 F.3d at 209).  
But as we clarified in Graham II, the discovery rule is a 
tolling rule, not a rule of accrual.  Graham II, 646 F.3d at 
150.  Assessing Congress’s intent in relation to the discovery 
rule therefore requires us to look to its intent regarding 
tolling, not claim accrual.  Cf. id. at 147, 150 (“Rules 
regarding limitations periods do not alter substantive causes 
of action.  Accordingly we do not think the discovery rule 
should be read to alter the date on which a cause of action 
accrues.”). 
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§ 2255(b) (2012).3  Missing from this text is an explicit 
command not to apply a discovery rule.  Although the statute 
requires that the complaint be filed “within six years after the 
right of action first accrues,” id., the text does not expressly 
foreclose application of the discovery rule.  Indeed, 
confronted with the Copyright Act’s similar language, we 
held the discovery rule applicable.  See Graham I, 568 F.3d at 
433 (addressing text providing that “[n]o civil action shall be 
maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is 
commenced within three years after the claim accrued” 
(alteration in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 507(b))); cf. Urie 
v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169–70 (1949) (analyzing 45 
U.S.C. § 56 under which “[n]o action shall be maintained 
under this chapter unless commenced within three years from 
the day the cause of action accrued” and applying discovery 
rule).  The simple fact that Congress, in drafting the statute, 
did not include express language of discovery is not 
equivalent to an explicit command that the discovery rule 
does not apply. 
 Nor does the “structure and text” of § 2255 imply a 
Congressional directive not to apply the discovery rule.  See 
Graham I, 568 F.3d at 434; cf. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 
(2003) (for questions of statutory construction, “[w]e consider 
the statute’s text and its structure to determine the legislative 
                                                 
3 In 2013, Congress amended § 2255(b) to extend the 
limitations period from six years to ten years.  Violence 
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 
113-4, § 1212(a)(2), 127 Stat. 54, 143 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b)).  Stephens concedes that this 
amendment did not revive his federal claims. 
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objective”); United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 151 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (“[T]he text of a statute must be considered in the 
larger context or structure of the statute in which it is 
found.”).  To the contrary, the statutory scheme supports the 
discovery rule’s applicability.  Section 2255 is an umbrella 
statute that creates a private cause of action for several crimes 
if the perpetrator victimizes a minor.  See § 2255(a) (listing 
criminal statutes).  Congress’s prime objective when it first 
passed § 2255 as part of the Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act 
of 1986 was to reach crimes related to child pornography.  
Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 703(a), 100 Stat. 1783 (listing only 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252).  Congressional findings also 
described § 2255 as an attempt to address the “multi-million 
dollar” child-exploitation industry, along with the 
“physiological, psychological, and emotional harm caused by 
the production, distribution, and display of child 
pornography” and the “lack [of] effective remedies under 
Federal law” available to “exploitation victims.”  Id. § 
702(1)–(3); see also S. Rep. No. 99-504, at 5 (1986) (noting 
that “child pornography victims have no real vehicle for 
adequate victim compensation” and therefore “are not 
adequately compensated for the substantial mental or 
emotional harms suffered as a result of being victimized”); S. 
Rep. No. 99-425, at 87 (1986) (same). 
 Yet this objective, particularly with regard to 
remedying the harms caused by the distribution of child 
pornography, would be thwarted without the discovery rule.  
Specifically, § 2255 creates a civil remedy for, inter alia, 
knowingly transporting, receiving, or selling visual depictions 
“involv[ing] the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.”  § 2255(a); §§ 2252(a)(1)–(3).  Violations do not 
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depend on the victim’s knowledge of such distribution.  
Instead, the focus is on the distributor’s conduct.  Indeed, 
child pornography is most often distributed in secret and 
without the victim’s immediate knowledge, with no fault 
attributable to the exploited minor.  Nevertheless, each act of 
distribution injures the child pornography victim such that 
“an omniscient plaintiff” would have a provable cause of 
action upon the completion of the act.  See Graham II, 646 
F.3d at 146 (claim has accrued when “all of its elements have 
come into existence”); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 759 (1982) (distribution of child pornography “is 
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children” because 
“the materials produced are a permanent record of the 
children’s participation and the harm to the child is 
exacerbated by their circulation”); United States v. Goff, 501 
F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The simple fact that the 
images have been disseminated perpetuates the abuse initiated 
by the producer of the materials.”).  Thus, without the 
discovery rule, civil redress would be unavailable to those 
victims of child pornography who are unaware during the 
statutory period of the distribution of visual depictions of 
their sexual abuse.  Given that Congress intended § 2255 to 
create a remedy for these very victims, the structure and text 
of § 2255 supports recognition of the discovery rule for § 
2255 claims. 
 Our approach in concluding that the discovery rule is 
applicable here is consistent with that taken by our sister 
circuits when considering whether the discovery rule applies 
to other federal statutes.  For example, the Second Circuit 
agreed with our conclusion in Graham I that the rule applied 
to Copyright Act claims.  Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, 
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Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2014).  Further, Psihoyos 
noted that the discovery rule may apply “where precedent, 
structure and policy all favor such a rule” despite the absence 
of express language in the statute adopting the discovery rule.  
Id. at 124 n.5.4  Other circuits have charted a similar course.  
See, e.g., Maverick Transp., LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
Admin. Review Bd., 739 F.3d 1149, 1154 (8th Cir. 2014) 
(noting that the Supreme Court has not “invalidate[d] the 
presumption of reading the discovery accrual rule into federal 
statutes” and therefore “[i]n federal question cases, the 
discovery rule applies in the absence of a contrary directive 
from Congress” (quoting Comcast of Ill. X v. Multi-Vision 
Elecs., Inc., 491 F.3d 938, 944 (8th Cir. 2007))); Skwira v. 
United States, 344 F.3d 64, 73–74 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding 
discovery rule applicable to wrongful death claims under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) despite statutory language 
                                                 
4 The Second Circuit also rejected the proposition that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216 
(2013), altered this analysis.  We agree.  In Gabelli, the 
Supreme Court declined to apply the “fraud discovery rule” to 
SEC enforcement actions for civil penalties under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1), (2).  
133 S. Ct. at 1221.  In doing so, the Court noted that 
“[a]pplying a discovery rule to Government penalty actions is 
far more challenging than applying the rule to suits by 
defrauded victims” given the significant differences between 
an SEC enforcement action and an individual victim’s civil 
suit.  Id. at 1222–24.  Gabelli thus provides little support for 
the conclusion that the discovery rule does not apply to an 
individual’s § 2255 claim. 
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indicating that such claims “shall be forever barred” absent 
written notice “within two years after such claim accrues” 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b))); cf. Plaza Speedway Inc. v. 
United States, 311 F.3d 1262, 1267–68 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that “the general statute of limitations accrual rule in 
non-medical malpractice FTCA cases remains the injury 
occurrence, and not the discovery rule” but applying the 
discovery rule to a negligence claim because the evidence 
demonstrated that “the plaintiffs could not have immediately 
known of the injury”). 
 Clash argues that we should adopt the rationale 
expressed in Singleton v. Clash, 951 F. Supp. 2d 578 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d sub nom. on other grounds, S.M. v. 
Clash, 558 F. App’x 44 (2d Cir. 2014),5 and reject application 
of the discovery rule to § 2255 claims.  Singleton involved 
essentially identical claims brought against Clash by three 
other plaintiffs.  Id. at 582–83.  The district court in Singleton 
held the discovery rule inapplicable to § 2255 claims in part 
because Congress “could have adopted language similar to 
that in state sexual abuse statutes which expressly provide for 
the discovery rule,” yet did not.  Id. at 587.  As noted above, 
however, the weight of authority rejects the proposition that 
Congress must have expressly adopted the discovery rule for 
                                                 
5 By nonprecedential summary order, the Second Circuit 
“assum[ed] without deciding that a discovery accrual rule 
applies to § 2255(b)” and affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal on the alternative ground that “the plaintiffs’ 
complaints failed to provide any reason why the plaintiffs 
were unable to discover their injuries prior to 2012.”  S.M., 
558 F. App’x at 45. 
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that rule to apply.  See, e.g., Psihoyos, 748 F.3d at 124–25 & 
n.5; Graham I, 568 F.3d at 433–437. 
 Singleton also relied on § 2255(b)’s express exception 
to the statute of limitations, which permits an action to be 
commenced “in the case of a person under a legal disability, 
not later than three years after the disability.”  See Singleton, 
951 F. Supp. 2d at 586.  According to Singleton, “this 
exception is plainly crafted to afford minors at least three 
years after attaining the age of eighteen to contemplate 
whether they choose to sue for conduct committed against 
them while they were minors.”  Id.  Thus, Singleton explains, 
the exception “counsels against implying an additional 
discovery rule into the statute.”  Id. 
 We disagree.  Section § 2255(b)’s exception suggests 
that Congress considered tolling in instances where the 
victim’s status prevents him from filing a timely lawsuit—for 
example, if the victim is still a minor when the six-year 
statute of limitations would otherwise have run.  But the 
inclusion of an exception for infancy and other legal 
disabilities does not speak to whether Congress considered 
and rejected the discovery rule, a conceptually distinct tolling 
doctrine that does not depend on the victim’s legal status but 
instead depends on when the victim “discovers, or with due 
diligence should have discovered, the injury that forms the 
basis for the claim.”  Graham I, 568 F.3d at 438 (quoting 
Disabled in Action, 539 F.3d at 209).  Because the text and 
structure of § 2255 as described above supports application of 
the discovery rule, we conclude that Congress’s inclusion of a 
limited exception to the six-year statute of limitations for 
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those under a legal disability does not indicate that Congress 
also intended to exclude the discovery rule. 
 To be sure, if Congress had expressly incorporated a 
limited discovery rule, or perhaps another entirely “judge-
made doctrine” tolling the statute of limitations, like equitable 
estoppel, TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 n.5 (2001), 
that inclusion might indicate “that Congress [had] implicitly 
excluded a general discovery rule,” id. at 28.  But Congress 
did not do so here, nor does a general discovery rule “in 
practical effect render [the exception for legal disabilities] 
entirely superfluous in all but the most unusual 
circumstances.”  See id. at 29.  Indeed, the discovery rule and 
a three-year extension for victims under a legal disability 
operate independently.  For example, if only the discovery 
rule were available, a victim under 12 years of age would be 
required to bring his claims while he was still a minor if he 
was aware of his injury at the time of his abuser’s conduct.  
Giving such victims a three-year extension after turning 18 
years old is hardly superfluous, nor is this independent 
application of § 2255’s exception for those victims under a 
legal disability unlikely to occur “outside the realm of 
theory.”  See id. at 30.  For these reasons, we hold that the 
discovery rule is applicable to § 2255 claims. 
B. 
 Despite this holding, however, the discovery rule does 
not save Stephens’s federal claims.  A statute of limitations 
defense is an affirmative defense that a defendant must 
usually plead in his answer.  Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 
249 (3d Cir. 2014).  Nevertheless, “we permit a limitations 
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defense to be raised by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) only if 
the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the 
cause of action has not been brought within the statute of 
limitations.”  Id. (quoting Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 
134–35 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Thus, a district court may grant a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) 
raising a limitations defense if “the face of the complaint” 
demonstrates that the plaintiff’s claims are untimely.  Id. 
(quoting Robinson, 313 F.3d at 134–35).  But federal courts 
“may not allocate the burden of invoking the discovery rule in 
a way that is inconsistent with the rule that a plaintiff is not 
required to plead, in a complaint, facts sufficient to overcome 
an affirmative defense.”  Id. at 251–52.  Thus, if “the pleading 
does not reveal when the limitations period began to run,” 
then “the statute of limitations cannot justify Rule 12 
dismissal.”  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 
835 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 Stephens’s complaint demonstrates that his claims are 
not timely, even applying the discovery rule.  As noted above, 
under the discovery rule the statute of limitations begins to 
run “when the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence 
should have discovered, the injury that forms the basis for the 
claim.”  Graham I, 568 F.3d at 433 (quoting Disabled in 
Action, 539 F.3d at 209).  A plaintiff’s ignorance regarding 
the full extent of his injury is irrelevant to the discovery rule’s 
application, so long as the plaintiff discovers or should have 
discovered that he was injured.  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 
635 (3d Cir. 2009) (statute of limitations begins to run “even 
though the full extent of the injury is not then known or 
predictable” (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 
(2007)).  “Were it otherwise, the statute would begin to run 
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only after a plaintiff became satisfied that he had been 
harmed enough, placing the supposed statute of repose in the 
sole hands of the party seeking relief.”  Wallace, 549 U.S. at 
391. 
 Here, Stephens’s allegations demonstrate that he was 
aware that Clash had inflicted an injury at least as of the time 
Stephens willingly engaged in sexual relations with Clash.  
From the outset, “Clash led [Stephens] to believe that [Clash] 
was interested in having a sexual relationship.”  A44, A54.  
Stephens willingly traveled from Harrisburg to New York 
City at Clash’s request.  Stephens then became a “compliant 
victim” of Clash’s sexual advances.  A45, A55.  Stephens’s 
complaint thus indicates that he was cognizant at all times of 
the sexual abuse from which he contends he suffered an 
injury.  Indeed, Clash’s nonconsensual6 sexual contact with 
Stephens itself inflicted an injury, regardless of Stephens’s 
willing participation or any additional, latent psychological or 
emotional injuries that Stephens may have suffered at the 
time of the abuse, or even later in life.  Much like a typical 
battery under state law, Stephens’s complaint demonstrates 
that he was aware that his legal rights had been violated and 
he had suffered an injury at the time he and Clash 
consummated their sexual relationship, even if he did not 
fully appreciate all of the consequences of that violation.  See 
Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164, 170 (Pa. 1997) (“In a 
typical battery all the elements of the offensive touching will 
be present and ascertainable by the plaintiff at the time of the 
touching itself.”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 905 (10th 
                                                 
6 By reason of Stephens’s minority status. 
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ed. 2014) (defining “injury” as “[t]he violation of another’s 
legal right, for which the law provides a remedy”). 
 Given that § 2255 creates a cause of action only for 
criminal violations occurring while the victim was a minor, 
Clash’s sexual relationship with Stephens was no longer 
actionable under § 2255 after Stephens turned 18 years of age 
in 2006.  Yet despite Stephens’s awareness of his sexual 
relationship with Clash, Stephens did not bring suit until 
2013, after the six-year statute of limitations had expired and 
also more than three years after Stephens became an adult.  
Accordingly, neither the discovery rule nor § 2255’s three-
year extension for persons under a legal disability saves 
Stephens’s federal claims. 
III. 
 Finally, we address Stephens’s argument that the 
District Court erred in dismissing his state law claim for 
sexual battery as untimely.  “[A] federal court must apply the 
substantive laws of its forum state in diversity actions, and 
these include state statutes of limitations.”  Lafferty v. St. Riel, 
495 F.3d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also 
Ross v. Johns-Manville Corp., 766 F.2d 823, 826 (3d Cir. 
1985) (federal courts sitting in diversity follow “the forum’s 
choice of law rules to determine the applicable statute of 
limitations”).  Accordingly, because Stephens filed his 
complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, we apply 
Pennsylvania law to determine the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
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 Under Pennsylvania’s borrowing statute, otherwise 
known as the Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign 
Claims Act, “[t]he period of limitation applicable to a claim 
accruing outside this Commonwealth shall be either that 
provided or prescribed by the law of the place where the 
claim accrued or by the law of this Commonwealth, 
whichever first bars the claim.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 5521(b).  The parties agree that Stephens’s sexual battery 
claim accrued in New York.  Under New York law, battery 
claims “shall be commenced within one year.”  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
215(3).  By contrast, under Pennsylvania law, actions for 
battery “must be commenced within two years.”  42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 5524(1). 
 On its face, New York’s statute of limitations is 
shorter than Pennsylvania’s, suggesting that New York’s 
statute of limitations should govern.  Indeed, Stephens agrees 
that New York’s one-year statute of limitations is the 
applicable “period of limitation” in this case.  But Stephens 
argues that the borrowing statute’s reference to “period of 
limitation” does not include the tolling rules used to 
determine when the period of limitation has run.  He argues 
that we should apply Pennsylvania’s rather than New York’s 
tolling rules.  We need not resolve this question.  Stephens 
concedes that his sexual battery claim is timely only if 
Pennsylvania’s statute governing claims alleging childhood 
sexual abuse, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5533, extends the 
time in which he may bring his claim.  Without the benefit of 
§ 5533, Stephens’s claims are time-barred under New York’s 
one-year statute of limitations.  In that regard, § 5533 
provides that 
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If an individual entitled to bring a civil action 
arising from childhood sexual abuse is under 18 
years of age at the time the cause of action 
accrues, the individual shall have a period of 12 
years after attaining 18 years of age in which to 
commence an action for damages regardless of 
whether the individual files a criminal 
complaint regarding the childhood sexual abuse. 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5533(b)(2)(i). 
 Although Stephens characterizes this statute as a 
tolling provision, a close reading of the text indicates that 
§ 5533(b)(2)(i) defines an entirely separate period of 
limitations for claims of childhood sexual abuse.  In general, 
tolling rules prevent the applicable statute of limitations from 
running despite an accrued cause of action.  See Graham II, 
646 F.3d at 147 (“There exist, however, various statutory and 
judge-made rules that operate to toll the running of the 
limitations period—that is, ‘to stop [its] running’; ‘to abate 
it’, or ‘[t]o suspend or interrupt’ it.” (alterations in original) 
(citations omitted)).  Thus, “[t]ime that passes while a statute 
is tolled does not count against the limitations period.”  Id. at 
147–48.  For example, under Pennsylvania law, infancy tolls 
the statute of limitations, but does not create a new period of 
limitations for minor plaintiffs.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 5533(b)(1)(i) (“If an individual entitled to bring a civil 
action is an unemancipated minor at the time the cause of 
action accrues, the period of minority shall not be deemed a 
portion of the time period within which the action must be 
commenced.”). 
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 This is not how § 5533(b)(2)(i) operates.  Rather than 
exclude a period of time from Pennsylvania’s otherwise 
applicable two-year statute of limitations, § 5533(b)(2)(i) 
establishes “a period of 12 years after attaining 18 years of 
age in which to commence an action for damages” for claims 
of childhood sexual abuse.  Instead of merely tolling the two-
year statute of limitations, § 5533(b)(2)(i) supplants the 
existing statute of limitations for battery claims.  The 
extended statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse 
claims is entirely independent of the two-year provision 
applicable to battery claims that do not constitute childhood 
sexual abuse.   
 Thus, regardless of which state’s tolling doctrines 
apply under Pennsylvania’s borrowing statute, the borrowing 
statute still renders Stephens’s claims untimely.  Under the 
borrowing statute, we must apply the “period of limitation” 
that “first bars” Stephens’s state law claim.  Stephens turned 
18 in 2006, and thus any sexual relationship continuing 
beyond that date would not constitute the abuse of a minor.  
Stephens did not file his complaint until 2013, well after the 
expiration of New York’s one-year statute of limitations.  
Given that § 5533(b)(2)(i) establishes a longer period of 
limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims and is not a 
tolling doctrine, New York’s statute of limitations “first bars” 
Stephens’s sexual battery claim, regardless whether 
Pennsylvania’s or New York’s tolling rules apply.  Thus, the 
District Court properly dismissed that claim as time barred. 
 Pennsylvania case law also supports this reading of 
§ 5533(b)(2)(i) in conjunction with Pennsylvania’s borrowing 
statute.  “The primary effect of borrowing statutes is to 
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prevent a plaintiff from gaining more time to bring an action 
merely by suing in a forum other than the forum where the 
cause of action accrued.”  Gwaltney v. Stone, 564 A.2d 498, 
501 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).  Thus, “[t]he provisions of 
Pennsylvania’s borrowing statute unequivocally evince the 
legislative intent to prevent a plaintiff who sues in 
Pennsylvania from obtaining greater rights than those 
available in the state where the cause of action arose.”  Id. 
(citing Wilt v. Smack, 147 F. Supp. 700, 704 (E.D. Pa. 1957)).  
Applying § 5533(b)(2)(i) to Stephens’s state law claim thus 
would not only contravene the text of Pennsylvania’s 
borrowing statute, but would also grant Stephens greater 
rights than he would have had if he had pursued his claim in 
New York, the state in which his claim accrued.  We do not 
believe that Pennsylvania’s legislature intended that result.7 
IV. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of Stephens’s complaint and amended complaint. 
                                                 
7 We note that some Pennsylvania courts have described 
§ 5533(b)(2)(i) in dicta as a tolling doctrine.  See, e.g., 
Delaney v. Archdiocese of Phila., 924 A.2d 659, 662 n.1 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2007); Baselice v. Franciscan Friars Assumption 
BVM Province, Inc., 879 A.2d 270, 274 n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2005).  But those decisions did not discuss § 5533(b)(2)(i) in 
connection with Pennsylvania’s borrowing statute, nor was 
the difference between a tolling provision and a statute 
establishing a different period of limitation important to the 
outcome of those cases.  Therefore, we find their persuasive 
value on this point to be limited. 
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Stephens v. Clash, No. 14-3337 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring: 
 
 I concur in the outcome of this case and with most of 
what my colleagues have said in reaching that outcome.  I 
part company, though, with the Majority’s decision to reach 
the issue of whether the discovery rule is available under 18 
U.S.C. § 2255(b).  Because the discovery rule does not save 
Stephens’s claims, the discussion of § 2255(b) is dicta, and it 
is dicta as to which I have some doubt. 
 
 As noted in the Majority opinion, § 2255(b) provides 
that “[a]ny action commenced under this section shall be 
barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the 
right of action first accrues or in the case of a person under a 
legal disability, not later than three years after the disability.”  
This legal disability exception is not a tolling provision.  It 
does not toll, stop, abate, suspend, or interrupt the limitation 
period.  Rather, it provides a separate limitation period for 
cases involving legal disability.  See William A. Graham Co. 
v. Haughey, 646 F.3d 138, 147 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that 
tolling provisions “operate to toll the running of the 
limitations period – that is, to stop [its] running; to abate it, or 
[t]o suspend or interrupt it” (alterations in original) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)).  In short, the three-
year legal disability provision in § 2255(b) operates like the 
twelve-year infancy provision in Pennsylvania law, which the 
Majority recognizes as a distinct limitation provision and not 
a tolling provision.  
 
But regardless of whether the disability provision in 
§ 2255(b) is thought of as a tolling provision or a limitation 
provision, the result is the same:  Congress has expressly 
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included one exception and, it seems, has done so deliberately 
and perhaps to the exclusion of other exceptions.  The 
Majority acknowledges the general rule applied in TRW Inc. 
v. Andrews:  “Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain 
exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are 
not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary 
legislative intent.”  534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  But my colleagues suggest that, for that rule 
to apply here, the disability provision in § 2255(b) would 
have to operate as a discovery rule or other “‘judge-made 
doctrine’” such as equitable estoppel.  See Maj. Op. at 13 
(quoting TRW, 534 U.S. at 31 n.5).  Although that reading 
comports with the result reached in TRW, where the Supreme 
Court refused to read a general discovery rule into a statute 
that explicitly included a limited discovery rule, the Supreme 
Court has taken a broader approach elsewhere.   
 
In United States v. Brockamp, the Court declined to 
read equitable tolling into a statute that included a number of 
“explicit exceptions to its basic time limits,” including the 
provision of distinct limitation periods to account for unique 
factual scenarios.  519 U.S. 347, 351 (1997).  The Court 
explained that “those very specific exceptions do not include 
‘equitable tolling.’”  Id.  The Court thus concluded that “the 
explicit listing of exceptions [and other aspects of the 
statute’s text] indicate to us that Congress did not intend 
courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ 
exceptions into the statute that it wrote.”  Id. at 352. 
 
 A sound argument can be made that that same 
rationale applies here.  Congress appears to have considered 
the possibility that, when a civil cause of action is based on an 
injury inflicted on a minor, the general rule of starting the 
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limitation period from the time of accrual could lead to 
inequitable results.  Rather than allowing the courts to apply 
traditional judge-made equitable doctrines to resolve the 
issue, Congress may be seen as having adopted a separate 
limitation period for persons who are under a legal disability, 
such as infancy, to address the very concern that the statute of 
limitations would otherwise run during that period of 
disability.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b).  That “explicit 
exception[]” to the basic time limit of § 2255(b) thus may 
indicate that “Congress did not intend courts to read other 
unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the 
statute that it wrote.”  Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 351, 352. 
 
 That the objectives of § 2255(a) might be better served 
by adopting a more expansive limitation period, particularly 
in cases of child pornography or abuse leading to repressed 
memory, would not empower us to change a Congressional 
policy decision on how best to balance the competing 
objectives of vindicating the rights created in § 2255(a) and 
placing an outer time limit on such vindication for the sake of 
repose.  Cf. Pension Trust Fund for Operating Engineers v. 
Mortgage Asset Securitization Transactions, Inc., 730 F.3d 
263, 275 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he purpose of statutes of 
limitations is to prevent stale claims … .”).  In the end, 
however, it is not necessary for us to decide what can be 
discerned of Congressional intent on this point.  The outcome 
for the claimant here is unaffected by the issue, for reasons 
persuasively set forth in the Majority opinion.  I would 
therefore leave for another day the question of whether 
§ 2255(b) permits application of the discovery rule. 
